论文信息

Gabriela Ignat / Lilia Șargu / Ioan Prigoreanu 等 6 人

Agriculture

论文解读

AI 辅助整理
方法
PRISMA叙事综述,检索Web of Science核心合集,纳入81项研究。
发现
制度信任与公平感解释农民反应,但证据多为态度性且未检验信任中介作用。
机会点
可研究数字化合规核验透明度对农民信任的影响,并开展中东欧与西欧农场级纵向比较。

论文摘要

2023—2027年共同农业政策(Common Agricultural Policy, CAP)以基于绩效的实施模式取代了基于合规的监督模式,并辅以绩效监测与评估框架(Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, PMEF)、综合管理与控制系统(Integrated Administration and Control System, IACS)以及基于遥感的监测。这一转变主要涉及欧盟委员会与成员国之间的关系;农场层面的条件性和行政控制仍然保留。本叙述性综述以PRISMA原则为指导,考察这些治理与合规机制如何与农民的态度、信任和行为相关联。研究基于对Web of Science核心合集的检索,纳入81项研究。这些研究指向一项重大制度转变,其效益取决于各治理层级之间尚不完整的协调一致性,而控制和审计机制则常被描述为行政成本与复杂性的来源。制度信任与感知公平成为解释农民反应的因素;然而,相关证据大多属于态度层面,涉及CAP较早时期,且未将信任作为中介变量进行检验。关于内在动机侵蚀的研究发现则不一致。数字化可能减轻行政负担,但其对合规核验感知不透明性的影响尚未在农民群体中加以考察。我们建议开展纵向的农场层面研究,并在中东欧成员国与其他成员国之间进行比较。

全文

Agriculture

Academic Editor: Efstratios Loizou
Received: 13 October 2026
Revised: 10 November 2026
Accepted: 11 November 2026
Published: 13 November 2026
Copyright: © 2026 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and
conditions of the Creative Commons
Attribution (CC BY) license.
Review
Governance and Compliance Mechanisms as Drivers of Farmer
Behavior Under the New Common Agricultural Policy: A
Literature Review
Gabriela Ignat 1
, Lilia Șargu 2 , *
, Ioan Prigoreanu 1 , *
, Mihaela-Cătălina Froicu 1 , Nicu Șargu 3

and Andrian Ulinici 4
1 Faculty of Agriculture, “Ion Ionescu de la Brad” Iasi University of Life Sciences, Mihail Sadoveanu Alley, No. 3,
700490 Iasi, Romania; gabriela.ignat@iuls.ro (G.I.); catalina.froicu@iuls.ro (M.-C.F.)
2 National Institute for Economic Research, Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, 45, Ion Creanga Street,
MD-2005 Chisinau, Moldova
3 Faculty of Economics, Free International University of Moldova, 52 Vlaicu Parcalab Street,
MD-2012 Chisinau, Moldova; nicu.sargu@mail.ru
4 Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, MD-2005 Chisinau, Moldova; ulinici@gmail.com

  • Correspondence: sargu@mail.ru (L.Ș.); ioan.prigoreanu@iuls.ro (I.P .)
    Abstract
    The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 2023–2027 replaces compliance-based oversight
    with a performance-based implementation model, supported by the Performance Mon-
    itoring and Evaluation Framework (PMEF), the Integrated Administration and Control
    System (IACS), and remote sensing-based monitoring. This shift primarily concerns the
    relationship between the European Commission and the Member States; conditionality and
    administrative controls at the farm level remain in place. This narrative synthesis, guided
    by PRISMA principles, examines how these governance and compliance mechanisms relate
    to farmers’ attitudes, trust, and behavior. It is based on a search of the Web of Science
    Core Collection and includes 81 studies. The studies point to a major institutional shift, the
    benefits of which are contingent upon an incomplete coherence across governance levels,
    while control and audit mechanisms are frequently described as sources of administrative
    costs and complexity. Institutional trust and perceived fairness emerge as explanations for
    farmers’ reactions; however, the evidence is largely attitudinal, pertains to earlier periods of
    the CAP , and does not test trust as a mediator. Findings regarding the erosion of intrinsic
    motivation are mixed. Digitalization may reduce administrative burdens, but its effect on
    the perceived opacity of compliance verification has not yet been examined among farmers.
    We propose longitudinal, farm-level research and comparisons between Member States in
    Central and Eastern Europe and other Member States.
    Keywords: common agricultural policy; governance; audit; compliance; farmer perception;
    institutional trust; performance-based delivery
  1. Introduction
    Agricultural sustainability remains one of the most pressing global challenges, shaped
    by climate change, biodiversity loss and the increasing pressure on food systems to simulta-
    neously ensure productivity and climate resilience. Despite ambitious policy commitments
    at the international and European levels, an implementation gap persists between policy
    design and practice at farm level. Thus, farmers’ decisions to adopt sustainable practices
    are not only determined by economic constraints and access to knowledge, but increasingly
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 2 of 31
by the governance structures through which agricultural policy is monitored, controlled
and enforced.
In the European Union, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the main instru-
ment through which sustainability objectives are translated into action at farm level. The
2023–2027 reform, however, changed the way delivery is organized and verified: the New
Delivery Model (NDM) moves from a rules-based approach, focused on detailed eligibility
checks, towards a performance-based one, monitored through the Performance Monitoring
and Evaluation Framework (PMEF), in which Member States are accountable for achieving
measurable results through their CAP Strategic Plans [1,2]. This transition redistributes
responsibilities between the European Commission and Member States, giving the latter
significant autonomy in the design of interventions [1,3], a change that has been critically
analyzed in the literature since the reform negotiation period [4]. It concerns mainly the
relationship between the Commission and the Member States: farmers remain subject to
rule-based conditionality and administrative checks, so the extent to which the shift changes
how farmers experience control is itself an open question.
This transition is supported by an extensive governance architecture, which includes
the Integrated Administration and Control System (IACS) and remote sensing monitoring
mechanisms [5], as well as the oversight exercised by the European Court of Auditors.
Although this architecture is frequently analyzed from an administrative or technical per-
spective [6], its implications may extend beyond institutional performance. Governance
and control mechanisms may shape how farmers perceive regulatory burden, institutional
trust and procedural fairness, factors that part of the literature associates with voluntary
compliance and the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices [7–9]. Motivation crowd-
ing theory offers a conceptual foundation for this relationship: it suggests that, under
certain conditions, external control interventions can erode intrinsic motivation to comply
when they are perceived as a reduction in decision-making autonomy [10–12]. Evidence
on how farmers perceive digital control is still scarce. A recent qualitative study of satellite
monitoring under the CAP , based on interviews with those who develop and operate these
systems, shows that remote sensing fosters an audit culture of strict control whose technical
limitations are recognized by the actors themselves [13]. Farmers’ own perceptions of
this monitoring were not examined, so whether the shift from inspector-based to algorith-
mic verification affects perceived fairness remains open. Understanding governance not
only as a control apparatus but also as a behavioral factor may help explain why formally
identical policy instruments produce heterogeneous outcomes across farms and Member
States, a heterogeneity documented, at the level of individual attitudes, by recent empirical
studies on farmers in several Member States [8,9,14]. However, the CAP governance litera-
ture and the farmer behavior literature appear to have developed largely in parallel, with
limited cross-referencing between administrative/compliance and behavioral/adoption
studies. In addition, because the 2023–2027 period is still at an early stage of implementa-
tion, much of the empirical evidence concerns earlier programming periods; this review
distinguishes between the two. It is a narrative review, guided by PRISMA principles, of a
corpus identified through a structured Web of Science search, and it addresses this gap by
synthesizing existing evidence at the intersection of the two fields, guided by the following
research questions:
RQ1: How has the governance and control architecture of the CAP evolved under
the 2023–2027 reform and what are its defining features compared with the previous
compliance model?
RQ2: How do farmers perceive audit and control mechanisms (e.g., IACS, satellite moni-
toring) and how does this perception relate to institutional trust and administrative burden?
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RQ3: What evidence is there in the literature on the link between perceived trust/le-
gitimacy of governance and farmers’ behavioural responses, including the adoption of
sustainable agricultural practices?
By addressing these questions, the review aims to bridge the two strands of literature
(institutional and behavioural) by providing a critical synthesis, not just a description,
of the governance mechanisms of the CAP . In this sense, the article directly responds to
calls in the sustainability transitions literature for a better understanding of how policy
delivery models, not only their content but also their application, shape farmers’ decisions.
Although the evidence reviewed concerns the European Union, the questions raised are
relevant to other regions where payments are increasingly tied to measured results and
digital monitoring.
2. Search Strategy and Review Methodology
2.1. Search Strategy
The literature synthesized in this review was identified through a structured search
conducted in the Web of Science Core Collection database, chosen as the main source due
to its extensive coverage of internationally indexed peer-reviewed journals in the field of
agricultural economics and public policy. The search strategy combined three thematic
clusters, corresponding to the three conceptual dimensions of the review: agricultural policy,
governance and control, and farmer behavior, respectively, joined by Boolean operators and
applied to the Topic field, which covers the title, abstract, and keywords of each record,
according to the string (“Common Agricultural Policy”) AND (governance OR audit OR
compliance OR IACS OR “performance-based”) AND (farmer* OR trust OR adoption OR
behavio*). The search was run on 9 September 2026 across the SCI-EXP ANDED, SSCI and
ESCI indexes of the Core Collection, and was restricted to publication years 2012–2026
(including Early Access records), to the document types Article and Review Article, and to
English-language publications. No filter by Web of Science category was applied. The exact
parameters are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Search strategy and query parameters.
Parameter Specification
Database Web of Science Core Collection
Indexes searched SCI-EXP ANDED, SSCI, ESCI (one record, a book chapter, excluded at screening, was returned by BKCI-S)
Search date 9 September 2026
Search field Topic (TS): title, abstract, author keywords and Keywords Plus
Search string
(“Common Agricultural Policy”) AND (governance OR audit OR
compliance OR IACS OR “performance-based”) AND (farmer* OR
trust OR adoption OR behavio*)
Period covered Publication years 2012–2026 (including Early Access records)
Document type filter Article, Review Article
Language English
Subject category filter None applied
Raw results n = 99
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on Web of Science Core Collection query parameters. * = trun-
cation wildcard (e.g., farmer* retrieves farmer, farmers).
The query thus defined returned a total of 99 raw records, whose annual distribution,
presented in Figure 1, reveals a pronounced concentration of relevant literature in the last
decade, with a visible peak in the years 2023 and 2026.
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Figure 1. Distribution of identified records by publication year. Source: authors’ own elaboration,
based on Web of Science Core Collection search results.
The Web of Science Core Collection was selected as the primary database because it
provides consistent journal indexing and uniform export of abstracts and author keywords,
elements necessary for the analysis of keyword co-occurrence. This choice, combined with
a restrictive search string, which requires the presence of the full phrase “Common Agricul-
tural Policy” alongside at least one term related to governance and one related to behavior,
may have resulted in the omission of relevant studies that employ different terminology (e.g.,
“cross-compliance,” “conditionality,” “agri-environment schemes,” or “farm advisory”),
are indexed exclusively in other databases, or belong to the “grey literature.” No additional
searches were conducted in other databases, nor was any citation tracking performed.
2.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
The identified documents were evaluated based on explicit eligibility criteria. A study
was considered eligible if: (i) it was published in a peer-reviewed journal as an original
article or a review article, in English, between 2012 and 2026, with the full text available;
(ii) its subject of analysis, rather than merely its context was the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) or EU policy on agriculture and rural development as implemented through
the CAP; and (iii) it addressed at least one of the following aspects: policy governance or
implementation architecture; mechanisms for control, audit, compliance, conditionality, or
monitoring; the perceptions, attitudes, levels of trust, preferences, or decisions of farmers
or other actors involved in implementation regarding CAP instruments; or digital tools
used in the administration and enforcement of compliance within the CAP . Documents
were excluded if: (a) the CAP was not the subject of the analysis (being mentioned only as
context or within a non-EU framework); (b) the study focused on aspects outside the scope
of governance, compliance, or behavior (e.g., agronomic or purely economic assessments
of agricultural holdings); (c) the document type was ineligible or the publication had been
retracted; or (d) the document was a duplicate or an additional publication of the same
underlying study. Official reports from European institutions were used solely as contextual
sources to describe the governance architecture and are not included among the studies
analyzed. Theoretical and cross-sectoral literature was not part of the corpus subjected to
the selection process; its role is interpretive, a point clarified in the relevant section.
2.3. Screening and Selection Process
The selection process was guided by the PRISMA (Preferred Reporting Items for
Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses) principles to ensure transparency and traceability
of the selection steps, without following a full systematic review protocol, as illustrated
in Figure 2. Of the 99 records identified, direct examination of titles and document types
led to the exclusion of two additional works, namely a book chapter that had not been
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eliminated by the automatic document type filter and a withdrawn publication, mandatorily
excluded regardless of its thematic relevance. Following this stage, the final set of literature
was reduced to 97 records, which advanced to the full-text eligibility assessment stage. Of
these, 16 were excluded following a full-text assessment based on the criteria in Section 2.2
(11 because they addressed the research questions only tangentially; 3 because they were
technical studies lacking a governance or behavioral dimension; and 2 because they did not
meet a substantive eligibility criterion; the records and reasons for exclusion are presented
in Supplementary Table S1), while 81 were included in the final synthesis (Table 2). After
the first round of review, nine records that had initially been set aside for thematic overlap,
which is not an eligibility criterion, were reassessed and included. The list of references
is broader than the set of included studies, as it also encompasses institutional reports,
theoretical sources on motivation and procedural justice, and methodological references;
these serve as context and support for interpretation and are not classified as studies in the
strict sense.
Figure 2. Flow diagram of the study selection process, adapted from the PRISMA 2020 template,
illustrating the identification, screening, eligibility assessment, and final inclusion of the 81 studies
synthesized in this review. Reasons for exclusion are detailed in Supplementary Table S1. Source:
adapted from Page et al. [15].
Table 2. Distribution of the included literature across the analytical framework categories.
Category Description Section RQ n %
A Governance architecture Section 3 RQ1 24 29.6
B Control mechanisms and their farm-level implications Section 4.1 RQ2 22 27.2
C Trust, legitimacy, behavioral response Section 4.2 RQ3 26 32.1
D Digitalization Section 4.3 RQ2–RQ3 9 11.1
Total 81 100
Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the classification of the 81 included studies.
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2.4. Analytical Framework
The included studies were organized into four analytical categories, which structure
Sections 3 and 4 of this synthesis and correspond to its three research questions (Table 2).
Category A (governance architecture, Section 3) addresses the first research question (RQ1);
Category B (control mechanisms and their implications at the farm level, Section 4.1) ad-
dresses the second research question (RQ2); Category C (trust, legitimacy, and behavioral
response, Section 4.2) addresses the third research question (RQ3); and Category D (digi-
talization, Section 4.3) addresses both RQ2 and RQ3, as digital tools shape both how control
is perceived and how trust in the controlling authority is formed. Within each category, the
studies were further grouped into subsections and thematic concepts (Tables 3–6), which
constitute the second level of the same analytical framework. Each study was assigned to
a primary category, such that the totals in Table 2 correspond to the number of included
studies; secondary thematic links between studies and concepts are represented in chord
diagrams which are presented in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 does not represent a fifth
category; rather, it draws upon additional literature from related fields, which was not
part of the initial corpus, to interpret the findings presented in Sections 3 and 4. The four
categories were defined deductively from the research questions; the thematic concepts
within each category were developed inductively from the content of the studies.
The information extracted from each study included: the country or scope, the program-
ming period, the research design, the type of outcome measured, and the main conclusions
and limitations (Supplementary Table S2). A single study could be associated with multiple
thematic concepts, which is why the chord diagrams show a higher number of links than the
total number of studies, but each study was assigned to only one primary category. Coding
was performed by a single author and was not independently verified; this is acknowledged
as a limitation.
Table 3. Thematic structure of the governance architecture literature.
Subsections Thematic Concepts Covered Description
The Shift from Rule-Based
Compliance to
Performance-Based Delivery
Performance Shift; Results-Based
Payments
The institutional transition from the
compliance model to the
performance/results-based one, as a central
principle of the New Delivery Model and
the results-based payment schemes as a
concrete application of this logic at the
intervention level.
Institutional Fragmentation and
Multi-Level Governance
Institutional Fragmentation;
Multi-Level Coordination
The distribution and possible fragmentation
of responsibility between national
authorities, intermediary organisations and
farmers, as well as the coordination (or lack
thereof) between EU, national, regional and
local levels in implementing governance.
Historical Precedents: Greening,
Cross-Compliance, and Structural
Diversity
Historical Legacy; Structural
Diversity
Historical precedents (2013 greening
reform, conditionality) relevant to the
dynamics of the current reform and the
structural heterogeneity of European
agriculture (collective ownership, type of
production, region) as a complicating factor
for uniform application.
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
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Table 4. Thematic structure of the compliance and control mechanisms literature.
Subsections Thematic Concepts Covered Description
Conceptual Foundations:
Cross-Compliance and
Information Asymmetry
Conceptual Foundations
The theoretical foundations of
cross-compliance and the problem of
asymmetric information between public
authority and farmer, which limits the
ability to verify genuine compliance.
Technical Infrastructure of
Control: LPIS, Data
Harmonization, and
Administrative Costs
Technical Infrastructure;
Compliance Standards
Technical control infrastructure (LPIS, GIS
data harmonisation, administrative
transaction costs) and practical application
of GAEC standards (erosion, carbon, water
management) in heterogeneous regional
contexts.
The Advisory Layer: Farm
Advisory Systems as Compliance
Intermediaries
Advisory Layer; Decision Support
Instruments; Effectiveness Gaps
The agricultural advisory system as an
institutional intermediary of compliance,
the decision-making support tools
developed for the new CAP , and the gap
between formal procedural compliance and
real effectiveness on environmental
objectives.
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
Table 5. Thematic structure of the trust and behavioral response literature.
Subsections Thematic Concepts Covered Description
The Temporal and Political
Dimension of Farmer Attitudes
Temporal & Political Attitudes;
Social Representations &
Legitimate Transgression
The temporal evolution of farmers’ attitudes
and their political consequences (protests,
symbolic stratification), together with social
representations and the phenomenon of
“legitimate transgression” in response to a
regulation perceived as maladaptive.
Preferences, Contract Design, and
Social Capital
Preferences & Contract Design;
Governance Networks &
Structural Barriers
Farmers’ preferences for the contractual
design of agri-environmental schemes,
social capital as a predictor of voluntary
participation, and governance networks
associated with trust (including structural
barriers inherited from the post-socialist
transition).
Emerging Themes Emerging Themes
Generational renewal, carbon farming, rural
identity and related rural governance
themes, which extend the classic discussion
of trust beyond the strict boundaries of the
CAP .
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
The chord diagrams (which are presented in Sections 3 and 4) represent a classification
of the studies, not independent empirical relationships. In each diagram, a sector represents
either a study or a thematic concept; a link connects a study to a concept to which it was
assigned by the author during the coding process. All links carry equal weight (a study is
either connected to a concept or it is not). Consequently, the width of a concept’s sector
reflects the number of studies assigned to it, while a dense cluster of links indicates that
multiple studies were coded under the same concepts; it does not imply that the studies are
empirically linked to one another, nor that the field constitutes a coherent body of evidence.
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Table 6. Thematic structure of the digitalization and governance literature.
Subsections Thematic Concepts Covered Description
The Dual Promise of
Digitalization: Efficiency and
New Vulnerabilities
Dual Promise; Data Sovereignty;
Compliance-to-Science Data
Reuse
Digitalization as a solution to
climate/geopolitical pressures, but also a
source of new governance challenges;
interoperability and sovereignty of
agricultural data in the context of GDPR;
reuse of control data (IACS, FMIS) as a
scientific and practical resource.
Algorithmic Monitoring and the
Question of Negotiable Control
Algorithmic Monitoring;
Farm-Level Technologies & Risk
Algorithmic compliance monitoring as a
change from inspector-based verification,
and farm-specific digital technologies, along
with risk management tools.
Source: authors’ own elaboration.
The distribution shows that the identified literature is concentrated in the first three
categories, while studies concerning digitalization are the least numerous. This reflects the
volume of studies identified through the search strategy and should not be interpreted as
an indicator of the strength of the evidence in each category, an aspect that is evaluated
separately in Sections 4 and 5.
The keyword co-occurrence map (Figure 3), generated with the VOSviewer (ver-
sion 1.6.20) software on the 99 identified records, illustrates the keyword structure of the
99 records: the central terms (“common agricultural policy”, “governance”, “management”)
occupy the dominant nodal position, while the terms associated with farmers’ perception
and behavior (“trust”, “attitudes”, “perceptions”, “farmers participation”) form a distinct
cluster, but are strongly interconnected with the governance core. Author keywords and
Keywords Plus were used; singular and plural variants of the same term were merged, and
terms occurring at least twice were retained (149 keywords). The map is descriptive; it
indicates terms that appear together in the retrieved records and is not used as independent
evidence for the thematic structure of the review, which derives from the classification
described above (Figure 3).
To avoid conflating different types of evidence, studies have been categorized based
on the specific outcome they measured. Attitudes and perceptions refer to opinions ex-
pressed by farmers or other stakeholders regarding a policy or instrument; intentions and
preferences relate to stated willingness or hypothetical choices, such as those found in
choice experiments; observed behavior pertains to documented practices, participation, or
compliance; and environmental outcomes refer to measured biophysical or ecological effects.
Compliance with requirements, the adoption of sustainable practices, and environmental
outcomes are treated as distinct categories. Studies that focus on institutional design or
technical performance, without investigating farmers’ perceptions, are not used as evidence
regarding how farmers perceive control. The term “mediator” is employed only in instances
where a study has explicitly tested a mediation relationship; otherwise, the role of trust and
legitimacy is described in terms of an interpretive or associative link.
The included studies are based on various designs: formal and theoretical models,
technical or data-driven assessments, quantitative surveys and stated-preference experi-
ments, qualitative studies, policy analyses, and previous syntheses. These designs do not
provide equivalent evidence for a given claim. Formal models identify mechanisms but
do not observe behavior; technical assessments document capabilities or costs; surveys
and choice experiments capture attitudes and stated preferences; qualitative studies offer
depth but have limited generalizability; and policy analyses rely on interpretation. No
formal quality assessment tool was applied, due to the heterogeneity of the designs and the
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fact that the synthesis is narrative rather than systematic. Instead, the type of evidence is
specified for each group of studies in Sections 4.1–4.3.
Figure 3. Keyword co-occurrence network map generated with VOSviewer based on all keywords
extracted from the 99 records identified in this analysis. (a) Network view. (b) Overlay view. Source:
authors’ own elaboration, generated with VOSviewer. Keyword co-occurrence network map generated
with VOSviewer, based on all keywords extracted from the 99 records identified in this analysis. Source:
authors’ own elaboration, generated with VOSviewer.
The corpus includes both primary studies and syntheses (reviews), which creates a
risk of double-counting the same underlying evidence. Syntheses are used to describe the
state of a field, while primary studies are used to document specific findings; conclusions
are not presented as stronger simply because a synthesis and a primary study covered by
it point in the same direction; this applies when a synthesis and a study likely included
within it are discussed together. Each included study was also classified according to the
programming period it addresses: the 2023–2027 CAP (design, implementation, or ex-ante
evaluation), previous periods (2007–2013 and 2014–2020), or periods not specific to the
CAP . In Sections 3–5, a finding is described as: (i) supported by evidence relating to the
2023–2027 CAP; (ii) a pattern documented under previous arrangements, which may or
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may not persist in the context of the current reform; or (iii) a hypothesis requiring further
investigation.
3. From Compliance to Trust: The New CAP Governance Context
This section addresses two related questions: how the CAP governance model has
evolved under the 2023–2027 reform compared with previous programming periods, and
what structural tensions the academic literature has identified regarding the implementa-
tion of this architecture. The analysis is organized into three subsections and six thematic
concepts, derived inductively from the literature reviewed (Table 3): the transition from
compliance to performance, including results-based payments as a core principle of the
new implementation model; the fragmentation and coordination of multi-level governance,
viewed as a structural challenge stemming from the redistribution of institutional responsi-
bilities; and the historical legacy of the “greening” reform, combined with the structural
diversity of European agriculture, as factors that condition the uniform application of the
new model. Evidence regarding the 2023–2027 CAP is still limited and largely „ex ante” in
nature, or based on initial strategic plans; many of the studies discussed below relate to the
2014–2020 period or an earlier timeframe, and are used to illustrate persistent issues that
the reform aims to address, rather than to establish the effects of the reform itself.
Four instruments, which are often analyzed together in the specialized literature, must
be distinguished, as they operate at different levels and have different implications for
farmers. The New Delivery Model (NDM) is the overarching framework for collaboration
between the European Commission and the Member States: each Member State designs its
interventions within a CAP Strategic Plan, subsequently approved by the Commission and
becomes accountable for results, rather than for compliance with detailed EU rules [1,3].
The Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Framework (PMEF) is the set of common
indicators and review procedures through which the Commission assesses the progress
of each Strategic Plan against EU objectives [1,2]; it governs reporting between Member
States and the Commission and imposes no direct requirements on farmers. Condition-
ality, in contrast, is a rule applied at the level of the agricultural holding: payments are
contingent upon compliance with statutory management requirements and standards for
good agricultural and environmental conditions, verified through the Integrated Adminis-
tration and Control System (IACS), which increasingly relies on satellite monitoring [5,6].
Results-based payments are an incentive at farm level in which remuneration depends on
measured environmental outcomes rather than on prescribed management actions [16,17];
Member States may include them in their Strategic Plans, but the delivery model does not
require their use [1,3]. The transition from compliance to performance therefore concerns
the relationship between the Commission and the Member States primarily. Farmers remain
subject to rule-based conditionality and administrative checks, and a change in how Member
States report performance does not necessarily entail an equivalent change in how farmers
experience control.
Figure 4 visually synthesizes the thematic structure of the analyzed corpus, highlight-
ing the degree of interconnection between the six concepts inductively identified in the
examined literature.
Within the classification, studies concerning institutional fragmentation and multi-
level coordination are often attributed to both concepts, which indicates that the scholarly
literature frequently addresses them together. This reflects the way in which the studies
were coded and does not demonstrate that the two phenomena are empirically inseparable.
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3.1. The Shift from Rule-Based Compliance to Performance-Based Delivery
The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy for 2023–2027 has primarily altered
the relationship between the European Commission and the Member States, the latter now
being accountable for results through their Strategic Plans, while the obligations of final
beneficiaries continue to be governed largely by conditionality [1,3]. The transition to the
New Delivery Model (NDM) was described from the design phase as a fundamental shift
from a compliance-based system to one based on results [18]. Erjavec et al. [19] warn early
on about a major structural risk: the new delivery model redistributes competences between
the European institutions, weakening the legislative control capacity of the European
Parliament in relation to the Commission and the Member States. Lovec et al. [20], analyzing
the same transition in a policy analysis, argue that, despite the rhetoric of flexibility, the
formal requirements and the evaluation model remain insufficiently robust to guarantee
a real long-term impact; applying this argument to the 2014–2020 CAP in Slovenia, they
find that the measures and allocated resources only partially correspond to the declared
objectives, with effects dispersed across several objectives and high costs per individual
objective. Marruecos-Rodríguez et al. [21], analyzing the result indicators of the 2023–2027
Strategic Plans, report a similar heterogeneity: although the framework was designed
to stimulate deeper compliance with sustainability objectives, the planned level of agri-
environmental ambition differs across Member States.
Figure 4. Chord diagram illustrating the thematic relationships between the key studies on CAP gover-
nance architecture and the six inductively derived thematic concepts: Performance Shift, Results-Based
Payments, Institutional Fragmentation, Multi-Level Coordination, Historical Legacy, and Structural
Diversity. Each link connects a study to a thematic concept assigned by the authors; all links have
equal weight. Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the studies and official sources [4,16–39].
Ex-ante assessments of the 2023–2027 plans point in the same direction. Midler
et al. [22] examine four Member States (France, Spain, Poland and Germany) and document
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that, although the new structure offers more flexibility, most have not used it to significantly
increase support for climate and environmental action, with the bulk of funding remaining
geared towards economic objectives. The European Commission’s mapping and analysis of
the 28 CAP Strategic Plans [23] documents an uneven distribution of the 2500 planned inter-
ventions worth 307 billion EUR. Both sources describe planned interventions, not outcomes.
Pečurlić et al. [24] examine a related issue for a recently acceded Member State, Croatia,
finding a relatively weak integration of biodiversity policy into agricultural policy despite
the formal adoption of European nature conservation legislation, a gap that the authors
attribute to insufficient institutional coordination between the EU and national levels.
In a complementary register, Prigoreanu et al. [40], analyzing sustainable energy and
environmental policies in EU agriculture in relation to the European Green Deal, point to a
similar tension between the declared ambition of the Green Deal and the implementation
capacity of the Member States, in line with the observations of Midler et al. [22] and Pečurlić
et al. [24] on the gap between formal climate objectives and practical results.
The transition to a model based on results, not just rules, is illustrated by Douthwaite
et al. [16], who document how results-based payment schemes moved, in Ireland, from
pilot projects to established instruments of national agri-environmental policy, as a response
to the poor performance of prescription-based schemes, and whose analysis covers Ire-
land’s decision to mainstream them in its 2023–2027 Strategic Plan. A complementary
case is analyzed by Pinto-Correia et al. [17], who examine results-based payments for the
conservation of high nature value silvo-pastoral systems and document progress but also
persistent difficulties in developing sufficiently robust farm-level indicators to support this
type of payment. Noack et al. [41] propose a performance-based agricultural payment
that translates national policy goals into farm-level objectives through voluntary, target-
based measures, as an alternative to eco-schemes, whose uptake remains below political
expectations; the model is a proposal and has not been tested empirically. Taken together,
only Marruecos-Rodríguez et al. [21], Midler et al. [22], the Commission mapping [23]
and Douthwaite et al. [16] concern the 2023–2027 plans directly, and they describe planned
or adopted policy rather than observed outcomes; the remaining sources concern earlier
periods or are not period-specific.
3.2. Institutional Fragmentation and Multi-Level Governance
The move from prescription to outcome implies a significant redistribution of insti-
tutional roles, an aspect systematically analyzed by Borniotto et al. [25], who develop
a multilevel framework for agri-environmental scheme governance (macro: setting pol-
icy boundaries; meso: implementation; micro: farmer actions) and, in a regional case in
Hauts-de-France, identify 40 barriers spanning organizational, power-related, and financial
issues that are unevenly distributed across levels. Bethwell et al. [26] apply an analytical
framework in three European regions (the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria) and find
that governance types differ in how well they accommodate regional specificities, and
thus in their influence on agricultural practices. Targetti et al. [27] use participatory fuzzy
cognitive mapping in the Marchfeld region (Austria) to examine how stakeholders perceive
interactions between policy mechanisms, rural society, and public goods, while Hauck
et al. [28] use social network analysis and key informant interviews to identify actors who
influence land-use decisions in the implementation of the EU green infrastructure strategy.
At EU level, Fleckenstein [42], tracing 65 forest and rural development policy documents,
finds that the rural development policy within the CAP has changed only incrementally
and along a path-dependent course, even as EU forest policy shifted toward climate and
biodiversity objectives, which has left forest and agricultural policy fragmented.
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Evidence on the farmer-facing end of these arrangements points in a similar direction.
In the Walloon Region, farmers in regular contact with network-bridging organizations
reported higher commitment to changing their practices [29]. In Ireland, alliances of com-
monage farmers, advisers, and politicians successfully challenged aspects of the proposed
Commonage Management Plans, illustrating how actors can influence multi-level agri-
environmental governance [30]. A perspective article on the Baltic Sea Action Plan argues
that weak implementation of abatement measures could be addressed by strengthening
local institutions and advisory services and by making greater use of performance-based
funding under the CAP [31]. In Sweden, interviews with 17 egg and broiler producers
combined with an analysis of CAP 2014–2020 documents suggest that neither farm-level
nor policy-level adaptive processes alone are sufficient to make farms robust, adaptable,
and transformable, which points to the importance of the fit between the two levels [32].
These studies concern the CAP periods before 2023 or are not tied to a specific period; none
of them evaluates the 2023–27 strategic plans directly. They rely mainly on conceptual
frameworks, case studies, network analysis, and stakeholder or farmer perceptions. They
therefore support the view that institutional fragmentation and the distribution of roles
across levels are plausible sources of implementation barriers, rather than demonstrating
their effect on compliance or on environmental outcomes under the New Delivery Model.
3.3. Historical Precedents: Greening, Cross-Compliance and Structural Diversity
The roots of these structural tensions can be traced to the 2013 “greening” reform, as
Matthews [4] analyzes the negotiation of the greening component and indicates that the
level of ambition of the reform would be very limited. At farm level, Cortignani et al. [33]
assess the compliance of specialized Italian arable farms with the new greening practices,
and Magaudda et al. [34] describe a series of Italian good practices showing how CAP in-
struments can be used to enhance green infrastructure locally, which suggests that regional
administrations may play an important role in implementation. Howe and Ross [35], offer
a comparative perspective from post-Brexit England, analyzing agricultural reform through
the lens of resilience theory: outside the CAP framework, the tensions between agricul-
tural policy and environmental sustainability were not automatically resolved, and new
governance challenges emerged. A legal analysis of agri-environmental law at EU, German
federal, and state levels finds that contradictions between subsidy law and command-
and-control law disincentivize farmers from establishing agroforestry systems [43], which
illustrates how the fit between instruments and specific land-use systems depends on how
the instruments are legally defined.
Figure 5 presents the positioning of studies on the institutional transition of the new
CAP within four governance-related concepts. In this classification, studies concerning
institutional fragmentation and multi-level coordination overlap to a considerable extent,
whereas studies on the shift toward a performance-based model are associated with fewer
other concepts. As a descriptive observation based on the authors’ coding, studies on
the formal shift towards a performance-based model are linked to fewer other concepts
than studies on fragmentation and coordination, which suggests that these two strands are
addressed largely separately in the reviewed literature.
The structural diversity of European agriculture further complicates the uniform ap-
plication of these instruments. Sutcliffe et al. [36], in a study of common pastures in the
Târnava Mare area (Romania), report that European support mechanisms designed for indi-
vidual farms have struggled to adapt to the collective ownership and use of land. Swain [37]
situates such tensions within a broader theoretical framework, arguing that the neoliberal
economic orthodoxy influencing EU policy has not always translated into institutional
mechanisms suited to the structural realities of rural Eastern Europe. Using a farm-level
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optimization model for Scottish beef and sheep farms, Vosough Ahmadi et al. [38] find
that the effects of “greening” measures and regional flat-rate payments are heterogeneous,
depending on both the production system and the specific region. Drawing on multi-
stakeholder workshops held in Germany and Sweden, Leventon et al. [39] contend that
agri-environmental management under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is often
inefficient, partly because it fosters fragmentation rather than collaboration among the
various actors involved.
Figure 5. Chord diagram illustrating the thematic relationships between the key studies discussed
above and four governance-related concepts: Performance Shift, Results-Based Payments, Institutional
Fragmentation, and Multi-Level Coordination. Each link connects a study to a thematic concept
assigned by the authors; all links have equal weight. Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the
studies and official sources [16–32,39].
All these studies relate to earlier periods of the CAP or to non-CAP contexts, and none
of them evaluate the 2023–27 strategic plans. They draw on policy analyses, case studies,
farm-level modelling, and stakeholder perspectives; only some of them examine compliance
at the farm level. Taken together, they suggest that coherence across levels of governance,
between policy instruments, and between policy ambitions and implementation capacity
was already a recurring challenge under the previous CAP . Whether the new implementation
model resolves or reproduces this challenge remains an empirical question. The way in
which control and audit mechanisms are designed and applied at the farm level is one area
where this can be examined.
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4. Operationalizing Governance at the Farm Level: Control, Trust
and Digitalization
4.1. Control Mechanisms and Their Farm-Level Implications
The analysis is organized around three subsections, corresponding to three dimensions
of how CAP control mechanisms become operational at the farm level: (i) the conceptual
foundations of cross-compliance and the problem of asymmetric information; (ii) the
technical control infrastructure, along with the compliance standards applied in practice;
and (iii) the advisory dimension, together with the effectiveness gaps between procedural
compliance and substantive environmental objectives (Table 4).
Figure 6 shows how the 20 studies discussed in this section were assigned to the six
thematic concepts listed in Table 4. Many studies were assigned to more than one concept,
meaning that the conceptual foundations of conditionality are often discussed alongside its
technical implications or its effectiveness.
Figure 6. Chord diagram illustrating the thematic relationships between the key studies on farm-level
control mechanisms and the six inductively derived thematic concepts: Conceptual Foundations,
Technical Infrastructure, Compliance Standards, Advisory Layer, Decision Support Instruments, and
Effectiveness Gaps. Each link connects a study to a thematic concept assigned by the authors; all links
have equal weight. Source: authors’ own elaboration, based on the studies [2,44–66].
4.1.1. Conceptual Foundations: Cross-Compliance and Information Asymmetry
Section 3 examined the institutional architecture through which the CAP defines its
governance objectives. This subsection focuses on the level at which these objectives become
operational: the mechanisms for control, verification, and payment conditionality. Bar-
tolini et al. [44] model the relationship between eco-conditionality and agri-environmental
schemes under conditions of asymmetric information regarding compliance. They show
that the two instruments interact: agri-environmental payments can provide incentives
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for eco-conditionality when monitoring and sanctions do not guarantee full compliance;
however, in a numerical example for Emilia-Romagna (Italy), farmers had few incentives
to comply with both instruments given the existing control and sanction systems. Gómez-
Limón et al. [45] develop a principal-agent model, calibrated using choice experiment data,
for the design of a farmland biodiversity scheme. Their results suggest that “second-best”
solutions differ significantly from those achievable under perfect information, with farmers
being overcompensated and monitoring should be stricter and sanctions harsher. Meyer
et al. [46] examine eco-conditionality in the EU and the United States from an economic-
institutionalist perspective, finding that, in both cases, standards exceeding regulatory
legislation function like payments for public goods but create serious problems; in the case
of Germany, they argue that treating EU eco-conditionality as a payment for public goods
does not align with the existing distribution of property rights.
4.1.2. Technical Infrastructure of Control: LPIS, Data Harmonization and
Administrative Costs
The technical infrastructure of control constitutes a second line of research, equally
relevant for understanding how farmers experience compliance; in this context, Sagris
et al. [47] present a conceptual model for evaluating the compliance of the Land Parcel
Identification System (LPIS) with CAP regulations and agri-environmental data needs,
developed to address issues regarding data harmonization and quality within Member
States. Kocur-Bera [48] extends this issue, examines the compatibility between the Land
and Building Cadastre and the LPIS in three villages within a Polish municipality (Warmia
and Mazury) and reports incompatibilities between the two data systems. Lomba et al. [49]
demonstrate that high-resolution agricultural administrative data, collected for control pur-
poses, can also support European-scale assessments of High Nature Value (HNV) farmland.
This technical uncertainty translates directly into administrative costs borne by farmers,
a phenomenon rigorously quantified by Weber [50] studies county-level agricultural ad-
ministrations in Hesse (Germany) and finds that tasks related to reimbursement, which
involve stringent specifications, consume the majority of their working time; furthermore, a
portion of the EU-related monitoring effort is fixed, which increases the cost per contract in
counties with fewer participants. Speroni et al. [51] estimate the costs of monitoring legal
requirements for animal identification and registration at four Italian farms; based on this
small sample, the findings suggest that verification tasks may vary depending on the size
and type of the holding.
Concrete standards of good agricultural and environmental practice (GAEC), a central
component of cross-compliance, are empirically examined by Borrelli et al. [52], who
simulate, for arable land in Italy, the effect of GAEC on soil erosion and soil organic carbon
under three scenarios and report a reduction in erosion relative to the baseline. Taguas
and Gómez [53] monitored runoff and soil loss on a single commercial olive farm in
southern Spain over six hydrological years, in which management followed CAP agri-
environmental requirements and was adapted to yearly conditions. At the European scale,
Panagos et al. [54] attribute persistent soil loss to a lack of policy governance rather than
of knowledge, and estimate that the CAP conservation measures reduce soil loss by water
erosion on arable land by about 20%. Quiroga et al. [55] estimate technical efficiency and
income disparities in the Ebro basin under changes in water rights, in the context of the
Water Framework Directive.
These studies relate to CAP periods prior to 2023 and are largely based on economic
models, technical assessments, and individual or small-scale case studies. None of them
directly observe farmers’ compliance behavior; instead, they highlight where control sys-
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tems create issues regarding data, costs, and design, rather than how farmers respond to
these factors.
4.1.3. The Advisory Layer: Farm Advisory Systems as Compliance Intermediaries
Agricultural advisory systems form an institutional layer between regulatory author-
ities and individual farmers. Jovanić and Đelić [56] analyze the European regulatory
framework for agricultural advisory services, noting that since the 2003 reform introduced
cross-compliance, these services have aimed to help farmers understand and meet the envi-
ronmental requirements of EU standards. In this sense, advisory systems can be viewed as
intermediaries capable of reducing the type of information asymmetry modeled by Bartolini
et al. [44] and Gómez-Limón et al. [45], although the legal and modeling studies above
do not test this effect empirically. Knuth et al. [57] come closer: in Germany, farm man-
agement systems introduced to support compliance with cross-compliance raised farmers’
confidence in facing cross-compliance checks in a survey in Brandenburg, although adop-
tion was generally low and varied across federal states with the institutional environment.
Hejnowicz et al. [58] surveyed 251 private agricultural advisors in England regarding their
experience with the “Environmental Stewardship” scheme. According to the advisors, the
exchange of knowledge between the advisor, the client, and Natural England is fundamental
to both the environmental effectiveness of the schemes and their compatibility with farm
businesses; however, tensions arising from the competing agendas of these actors can hinder
this interaction.
A second group of studies focuses on decision support and evaluation. Kouriati
et al. [59], one of the few studies in this subsection that addresses the 2023–2027 CAP applies
a multi-criteria mathematical programming model to three groups of farmers in Greece to
optimize land use, profit, labor, and costs; they present this model as a decision support
tool for policymakers and as a means to better understand the new eco-conditionality rules.
Cagliero et al. [2] examine the proposed evaluation rules for the 2023–2027 CAP . Noting
a shift from a compliance-based approach to one based on performance, they identify
elements that could weaken the evaluation process and potentially lead to a recurrence
of past failures; their analysis focuses on evaluation rules and explicitly excludes control
requirements. Through historical and neo-institutional lenses, Doukas et al. [60] trace how
environmental and climate concerns have been integrated into the CAP-making framework,
noting that conditionality is used to link funding to outcomes. Sauquet [61] employs a
difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity design—based on land-use data from
French farmers—to evaluate the 2013 “greening” measure for crop diversification. The
study finds that farms larger than 30 hectares increased their compliance and the number
of crops cultivated, and that farms above and below this threshold responded differently.
Finally, several studies examine the effectiveness of conservation instruments. Con-
cepción and Díaz [62] evaluate the potential of agri-environment schemes and habitat
indicators linked to “greening” in supporting bird diversity on agricultural land in Spanish
cereal-growing regions; they note that these instruments were not associated with a for-
mal performance monitoring program. Regarding Natura 2000 sites in Transylvania, Loos
et al. [63] report that financial incentives for high-nature-value grasslands are insufficient
to prevent intensification or abandonment; they further note that knowledge of the broader
landscape is limited and that governance mechanisms are unclear, recommending a shift
toward results-based payments. Tyllianakis and Martin-Ortega [64] systematically analyze
evidence concerning the willingness of land managers to accept compensation for agri-
environment schemes. They find that while farmers are generally prepared to participate,
the evidence offers few insights into how this willingness correlates with contract design;
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they identify support for farmers and new methods for monitoring compliance as aspects
worthy of consideration.
4.2. Trust, Legitimacy, and Behavioral Response
The analysis is organized around three subsections, corresponding to the relationship
between governance and farmers’ behavior: the temporal and political dimension of farmers’
attitudes, together with social representations and the phenomenon of legitimate trans-
gression; farmers’ preferences for contractual design and governance networks associated
with trust; and, respectively, emerging themes that extend the classical discussion of trust
beyond the strict boundaries of the CAP (Table 5).
Figure 7 shows how the studies on trust, legitimacy and behavioral response were
assigned to five thematic concepts.
In this classification, studies on the social representations of compliance are often also
linked to the political dimension of farmers’ attitudes, suggesting that these two topics are
frequently addressed together. Research on contract design forms a relatively coherent
cluster, whereas emerging themes (generational renewal, carbon farming, rural identity)
are connected to only a small number of other concepts. This describes the structure of
the body of literature; it does not, in itself, demonstrate that these themes are correlated in
practice, or that the emerging themes are at an early stage of development.
Figure 7. Chord diagram illustrating the thematic relationships between the key studies on trust,
legitimacy, and behavioral response and the five inductively derived thematic concepts: Temporal
& Political Attitudes, Social Representations & Legitimate Transgression, Preferences & Contract
Design, Governance Networks & Structural Barriers, and Emerging Themes. Each link connects a
study to a thematic concept assigned by the authors; all links have equal weight. Source: authors’
own elaboration, based on the studies [7–9,14,65–87].
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4.2.1. The Temporal and Political Dimension of Farmer Attitudes
This subsection examines how institutional structures can be linked, at the individual
level, to farmers’ attitudes and, ultimately, to their behavior. McCormack et al. [8] directly
challenge the implicit assumption found in many public policy studies that farmers’ attitudes
remain stable once formed by documenting, at the farm level, how farmers’ attitudes toward
cross-compliance evolved over several cycles of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform.
In Hungary, a duration analysis of farm accountancy data for 2014–2021 finds a weak
relationship between adopting an agri-environmental-climate scheme and maintaining
participation, and a preference for market income over the scheme subsidy, and it points to
the farm business model, alongside policy measures, as a factor in the decision whether
to renew a contract [65]. Based on a survey of German farmers, Bethge and Lakner [9]
report that respondents expressed uncertainty regarding the future of direct payments,
a sentiment emerging in a context where the recent CAP reform was met with protests
across Europe; while the survey measures attitudes, it does not test for a causal link between
distrust and the protests. A mixed-methods study of German farmers in nature-protected
areas finds that they hesitate to implement more than the prescriptive cross-compliance and
direct-payment measures, and that their views on action- and success-oriented payments
differ across farmer types and locations [66]. Holdo [14] interprets differences in farmers’
perceptions through a comparative theoretical framework, drawing on “policy feedback
theory” and Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic capital to explain, using the cases of Italy
and Sweden, why the CAP generates divergent perceptions among different categories of
farmers. The author’s concept of “symbolic stratification” suggests that farmer resistance
and recent protests in the agricultural sector cannot be understood without considering the
farmer’s social position within their own professional field, rather than focusing solely on
the objective content of the policy in question. The psychosocial dimension of compliance
is explored by Gaymard et al. [7], who use the theory of social representations to analyze
the discourse of French farmers regarding environmental regulations within the framework
of the CAP . They conclude that when farmers perceive regulations as ill-suited to actual
practices, a “legitimate transgression” may arise, a form of non-compliance that farmers
consider morally justified, regardless of its formal illegality. Grohmann and Feindt [67],
in their analysis of the integration of environmental policy into CAP implementation in
Germany over nearly a decade (2014–2022), show that the gap between stated environmental
objectives and their implementation depends on the calibration of the policy mix; the link to
farmers’ perceptions of fairness is an interpretation proposed within this synthesis, rather
than a finding tested in the study itself. Klebl et al. [68], through a systematic analysis of
the behavioral determinants of on-farm biodiversity management in Europe, find that the
available empirical evidence regarding farmers’ motivations remains fragmented and lacks
an aggregated synthesis.
4.2.2. Preferences, Contract Design and Social Capital
The behavioral response of farmers to conservation incentives is documented through
a series of studies on preferences and contract design. Schulze et al. [69], in a systematic
review of 127 studies based on choice experiments regarding farmers’ preferences for agri-
environmental contracts, indicate that preferences for contract structure vary and should
be taken into account when designing such schemes; the effectiveness of the schemes
themselves was not measured. Alló et al. [70], analyzing the preferences of Spanish farmers
for agri-environmental schemes aimed at bird conservation, identify social capital as a
significant predictor of the willingness to participate voluntarily, suggesting that social trust
among farmers, not just trust in institutions, plays an independent role. Raymond et al. [71],
comparing different perspectives on “responsible landscape management” among rural land
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managers, show that preferences for the structure of post-2020 schemes vary depending
on how each farmer perceives their relationship with the landscape they manage. The
perceived legitimacy of governance mechanisms may also depend on the extent to which
farmers are included in policy-making: Rovai et al. [72] develop a decision support model
for the governance of sustainable rural landscapes, applied in the Orcia Valley in Tuscany
and demonstrate that local participation in the decision-making process enhances the
acceptability of conservation measures; meanwhile, Giordano et al. [73], in evaluating the
acceptability of groundwater protection measures within various agricultural policies, finds
that acceptability is linked to the extent to which stakeholders involved in resource-related
conflicts are consulted.
The relevance of relational governance to trust is addressed by Runhaar et al. [74]; their
study on the promotion of nature conservation by Dutch farmers indicates that aligning pro-
ductive agricultural practices with conservation goals depends on the quality of governance
mechanisms. Studies of Dutch farmer collectives, which the CAP has allowed to apply for
and receive agri-environmental scheme payments, propose an assessment framework based
on three forms of professionalization (organizational, occupational, and systemic) [75]
and find that collectives differ in their professionalization according to their history, re-
sources, and scale [76]. Manolache et al. [77], analyzing governance networks surrounding
grasslands in Romania, which have contrasting management histories, describe a situation
where the Common Agricultural Policy runs counter to the objectives of the 2020 Biodiver-
sity Strategy, hindering the coordinated governance of high-nature-value grasslands; this
serves as an example of institutional incoherence that can affect relationships among local
stakeholders. Maréchal et al. [78], synthesizing the views of a large group of European
public policy experts, argue that a “radical shift” is required to enhance the environmental
benefits generated by European agriculture, and that incremental adjustments to existing
instruments will not suffice.
Schüler et al. [79], through a qualitative study conducted in the southern part of the
state of Lower Saxony, examine farmers’ perceptions of “greening” measures and their
adaptive responses to them; the authors point to a discrepancy between the administrative
logic of the regulations and the practical logic of decision-making at the farm level. Prazan
and Theesfeld [80], in their analysis of agri-environmental contracts aimed at biodiversity
conservation in the post-socialist Czech Republic, identify an obstacle specific to the new
member states: the institutional transition from collectivist to market-based systems is
associated, according to the authors, with a lower level of trust in institutions, a factor that
may influence farmers’ willingness to enter into long-term voluntary contracts.
Several emerging themes extend the discussion on trust and behavior beyond the core
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Carbone et al. [81] analyze whether EU support
for young farmers establishing themselves in agricultural holdings encourages innovation
and network integration, against a backdrop where an aging agricultural population and a
lack of generational renewal threaten the viability of European agriculture. Hönle et al. [82],
by examining regulatory levels in the governance of carbon-sequestering agricultural prac-
tices (“carbon farming”) across eight member states, point to an issue of coherence: the
new regulatory framework for carbon credits overlaps, at times contradictorily, with exist-
ing instruments under the CAP . Escribano et al. [83] examine stakeholders’ perceptions
regarding the role of extensive livestock farming in combating climate change, revealing
a tension between the societal pressure exerted on the livestock sector and the farmers’
own perception of their role in the climate transition. Martínez-Vérez et al. [84] compare
the motivations of farmers, restaurants, and policymakers concerning “zero-kilometer”
(local) food systems in Spain, highlighting points of convergence and divergence relevant
to the development of policies that support short supply chains. Menconi et al. [85] analyze
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the role of Local Action Groups in strengthening a sense of territorial belonging, while
Rouillard et al. [86], in examining flood risk management at the river basin level in Scotland
and England, extend the discussion to related themes of rural and environmental gover-
nance, which are relevant to a broader interpretation of the relationship between farmers
and institutions.
The evidence presented in Section 4.2 is more directly linked to behavior than that
in Section 4.1, yet it is equally heterogeneous from a methodological standpoint. Most of
these approaches capture stated attitudes, preferences, or intentions rather than observed
behaviors; the main exception is the Hungarian duration analysis [65], which uses observed
participation data but does not examine trust or control. The evidence from choice experi-
ments pertains to hypothetical contractual options. Trust is rarely measured as a variable:
some studies address attitudes toward policy in general, rather than toward specific audit
and control mechanisms; furthermore, none of the studies analyzed here tested trust or per-
ceived legitimacy as a statistical mediator between governance and behavior. Contributions
exploring emerging themes have only an indirect connection to CAP governance. Conse-
quently, institutional trust and perceived legitimacy should be interpreted as a recurring
explanatory thread, plausibly associated with farmers’ reactions rather than as a mediating
mechanism whose role has been empirically demonstrated.
4.3. Digitalization and Governance: New Tools, New Behaviors
This section examines the role of digitalisation in CAP governance, which may reduce
administrative burdens and may also introduce new forms of perceived opacity. The
analysis is organised around two subsections: the dual promise of digitalisation, together
with the issue of data sovereignty and the re-use of control data as a scientific resource;
and, respectively, algorithmic compliance monitoring and farm-specific digital technologies
(Table 6).
Studies on the reuse of control data as a scientific resource are linked to those concerning
algorithmic monitoring by a tension that runs through this section: the very same digital
infrastructure that can enhance institutional transparency might, at the same time, alter the
human, negotiable elements of verification. This suggests that the potential benefits and
risks of digitalization could be facets of the same process of the digital transformation of
agricultural governance, rather than characteristics of distinct technologies; the evidence
analyzed here does not allow for the verification of this point.
4.3.1. Digitalization and Governance: New Tools, Open Questions
Governance, control and institutional trust discussed in the previous sections are in-
creasingly mediated by a new technological layer. Kandel et al. [87], in a review dedicated
to the role of digitalization in supporting farmers and strategic policies for food security
and sustainability, document exactly this dual tension: digitalization is presented simulta-
neously as a solution to climate and geopolitical pressures and to reducing dependence on
agrochemical inputs, but also as a source of new challenges related to interoperability, data
governance and unequal access to digital infrastructure. The issue of data interoperability
is directly and technically addressed by Camaccioli et al. [88], who propose an agricultural
data space according to the IDS (International Data Spaces) standard, adapted to the Italian
context, aimed at reconciling heterogeneous data sets generated by sensors, machines and
administrative systems with the requirements of data sovereignty and compliance with
the General Data Protection Regulation. This proposal points to a tension that could affect
farmers’ trust: as the administration of the CAP increasingly relies on digital data flows,
farmers may be required to share a growing volume of information about their holdings,
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 22 of 31
which raises the issue of control over this data. The study constitutes a technical proposal
and does not examine the perspectives of farmers.
Even the central technical component of the CAP control system, the Integrated Ad-
ministration and Control System (IACS), has itself become a valuable source of data for
research, beyond its initial administrative function. Leonhardt et al. [89], in a systematic
mapping review of the uses and scientific potential of land use data from IACS, document
that, starting with the 2021 CAP reform, Member States are required to make public annual
geospatial datasets on crops declared by farmers for payments, a significant change in
institutional transparency, transforming an instrument originally designed for compliance
verification into a public scientific resource. This openness of monitoring data is comple-
mented, at the practical farm level, by the analysis of Melzer et al. [90] on commercial farm
management information systems (FMIS), which document the functions actually used by
farmers, not just those theoretically designed by developers, highlighting a relevant gap
between available technical functionalities and actual acquisition statistics.
4.3.2. Algorithmic Monitoring and the Question of Negotiable Control
The role of digitalization as a tool for monitoring compliance is illustrated by Paredes-
Gómez et al. [91], who develop a methodology for detecting irrigation through remote mon-
itoring. This approach is designed to replace traditional on-site inspections and computer-
assisted photo-interpretation, conducted by paying agencies on a sample of applicants
with checks based on satellite monitoring. This shift from sampling-based inspection to
systematic monitoring highlights a tension discussed in the literature on control: while
digital monitoring promises more comprehensive and potentially more uniform coverage
of compliance checks, it may also alter the forms of interaction between the farmer and the
paying agency. This concerns, for instance, the opportunity to explain a discrepancy, the
exercise of a certain margin of discretion by the inspector, the correction of an error before
a sanction is applied, or the challenging of a decision. These forms of negotiability have
varying implications for the perception of fairness and trust, and the literature reviewed
here does not establish which of them are, in reality, diminished by the use of remote
sensing. The only study that examines remote sensing for CAP compliance empirically is
that of van der Velden et al. [13] (“Governance by Satellite”). It was not retrieved by the
search protocol; it is cited in the Introduction and used here as a contextual source, and it
is not counted among the included studies (Supplementary Table S2, sheet “Contextual
sources”). Based on interviews with stakeholders who develop and support these technolo-
gies, including staff from paying agencies, the study shows that remote sensing fosters an
“audit culture” centered on mapping, quantification, and strict control; at the same time,
the participants themselves acknowledge the technical and governance-related limitations
of these technologies. Since the farmers subject to monitoring were not interviewed, the
study documents how the technology reshapes the perspective of regulatory agencies, albeit
without establishing how it is perceived by the farmers themselves. In a forward-looking
analysis of the next generation of agri-environmental schemes, Cord and Wätzold [92]
discuss how digital tools and biodiversity monitoring technologies could be integrated into
such schemes, noting that there is little research examining this integration.
Regarding technologies and tools specific to agricultural holdings, Kiefer et al. [93]
present a model-based study on the economic feasibility of virtual fencing in pasture-based
dairy farming systems, a context characterized by the ongoing decline of this type of agri-
culture in Europe. The study focuses on a technology adopted voluntarily by farmers and is
relevant here due to the contrast it offers to mandatory administrative monitoring. Njavro
et al. [94] conduct a stress test on the operational model of a mutual fund for agricultural
risk management, an instrument introduced via the CAP and conclude that, within the
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 23 of 31
current institutional framework, the use of mutual funds is difficult to implement in Croatia.
The study concerns a risk management tool rather than digital monitoring; however, it
is relevant to this subsection due to its focus on issues related to trust, governance, and
agricultural technologies. In a conceptual commentary on integrating circular economy
principles into the “Farm-to-Fork” strategy to prevent food waste, Doukas et al. [95] analyze
the interface between the circular economy and the objectives of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP); the connection between this approach and the digitalization of CAP
governance is indirect.
Taken together, the studies present an ambivalent picture of digitalization within the
governance relationship between farmers and the state. On the one hand, digital tools may
reduce administrative burdens, a possibility suggested by the cost evidence in Section 4.1
but not tested in the studies reviewed here, and they can enhance institutional transparency,
as illustrated by the opening of access to IACS data [89]. On the other hand, digitalization
raises questions regarding data sovereignty [88] and unequal access to digital infrastructure
among the diverse types of European farms [87], and, as a hypothesis not yet tested among
farmers, the opacity of compliance verification via algorithms [13,91].
5. Gaps, Tensions and Critical Discussion
The evidence reviewed in Sections 3 and 4 is heterogeneous, and it reveals structural
tensions and methodological gaps that go beyond the narrow confines of the CAP-specific
literature. To situate these tensions in a broader theoretical context, this section mobilizes,
in addition to the sources already discussed, an additional body of literature from public
policy evaluation, motivation and compliance theory, and trust in digital technologies. The
section first situates the tensions identified in Sections 3 and 4 in the broader literature, then
examines contradictory and conditional findings, and finally discusses the limitations of
the evidence base and of this review. The additional literature mobilized in this section was
selected by the authors outside the search protocol; these sources are not counted among the
81 included studies and are listed in Supplementary Table S2 (sheet “Contextual sources”).
The tension between the institutional flexibility of the new governance model and
its systemic coherence, as well as the dissociation between procedural compliance and
substantive effectiveness, is not unique to the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy); rather,
it echoes issues discussed in the specialized literature on public policy evaluation. In a
systematic review of agricultural policy evaluation methodologies applied over the last
50 years, Bastidas-Orrego et al. [96] describe a progressive evolution: from simple quantita-
tive tools (matrices, econometrics) toward complex hybrid approaches, including machine
learning and agent-based modeling. The authors highlight that the integration of sustain-
ability variables remains uneven, a tension that mirrors the situation identified within the
CAP’s governance architecture. In a systematic review of studies employing non-parametric
efficiency methods to evaluate public interventions, Mergoni and De Witte [97] conclude
that efficiency analysis and effectiveness evaluation have largely developed in isolation
across various policy domains, and that their integration is necessary. This finding parallels
the divide between institutional and behavioral literature identified in the present paper;
however, it concerns evaluation methods rather than CAP governance, and the applicability
of these conclusions to the CAP context has yet to be tested.
The perceived legitimacy of control mechanisms can be linked to the literature on
procedural justice. An OECD report on perceived fairness in regulatory policies [98] syn-
thesizes evidence showing that elements of procedural justice, integrated into the design
and implementation of a regulation, are associated with greater acceptance of authority
decisions and voluntary compliance. This mechanism is consistent with the concept of
“legitimate transgression,” described by Gaymard et al. [7] in the context of French farmers.
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 24 of 31
An experimental study on voluntary tax compliance [99] points to an interplay between
procedural justice, distributive justice, and decision-making power in predicting voluntary
compliance; this suggests that the mechanism in question is not unique to the agricultural
sector. Research on procedural and distributive justice in environmental impact assess-
ment [100], as well as an analysis of how public officials’ perceptions of organizational
culture influence procedural justice within environmental policy processes [101], links
the participation of those affected by a regulation to its perceived legitimacy. This body
of literature offers a conceptual parallel for the CAP; however, the studies reviewed here
did not examine whether participation in the design of CAP interventions functions in the
same way.
The tension between external control and intrinsic motivation is addressed in a broader
body of literature that extends beyond the scope of the CAP . Darragh and Emery [102], in
a small qualitative case study of farmers in South West England who had left the Entry
Level Stewardship scheme, find that farmers kept long-standing practices but were selective
about adopting new ones, which does not fit a simple crowding-out account. A study of
1064 Chinese farmers [103], employing stratified regression models and propensity scores,
indicates that external incentives lead to a reduction in intrinsic motivation regarding the
protection of soil quality. This suggests that the mechanism in question is not limited to the
European context, although its transferability within the framework of CAP governance,
characterized by a different institutional logic, remains uncertain.
A study on Globally Important Agricultural Heritage Systems (GIAHS) [98,104] in-
dicates that the nature of the “crowding-out effect” depends on how farmers perceive
external intervention: when an incentive is viewed as support rather than a form of control,
intrinsic motivation can be strengthened rather than eroded. This nuance is relevant in
light of findings by Gaymard et al. [7], where the perception of unjust control is linked to
“legitimate transgression.” The review by Rode et al. [12] is complemented by a framed
field experiment on forest conservation in Tanzania [105], which found no significant last-
ing crowding-out in the payment treatments, while mandates showed some crowding-in.
This experiment tested four types of policy interventions: individual payments, collective
payments, and two levels of obligations backed by sanctions and found no significant or
persistent crowding-out effect in the case of payment schemes; conversely, obligation-based
interventions had a positive effect, stimulating motivation. This finding complicates a
simplistic interpretation of the “motivation crowding-out” theory, suggesting that the rela-
tionship between control and motivation depends on how a mechanism is designed, rather
than merely on the presence or absence of external control. A study from southwestern
China [106], drawing on the concept of the “bystander effect,” proposes an alternative
way to foster ecological responsibility among farmers through mechanisms such as the
diffusion of responsibility, social evaluation, and the perception of urgency. This approach
opens new avenues for institutional design that have yet to be explored in the literature
dedicated to the Common Agricultural Policy. The perspective of intermediary actors,
which Hejnowicz et al. [58] note is underrepresented and remains little studied. Carter
and Siddiki [107], in a national survey of U.S. organic producers in a voluntary program,
find that financial participation motives are associated with compliance motivated by fear
of penalties, whereas movement-related motives are associated with a sense of personal
obligation; this offers a comparison for how compliance motivations relate to regulatory
enforcement, although the study does not address the role of intermediaries. Consequently,
the limited attention paid to the perspective of advisors and other actors involved in im-
plementation appears to constitute a gap in the literature on CAP , a gap that the sources
analyzed here do not address.
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 25 of 31
The tension between transparency and algorithmic opacity is extensively addressed in
the recent literature concerning trust in digital agriculture. A systematic review of trust
in artificial intelligence-based technologies in agriculture [108], identifies low trust and
a pronounced digital divide among the dominant themes, together with barriers related
to data governance, technical skills, algorithmic explainability, reliability, and cost. These
are accompanied by five interconnected clusters of barriers: data governance, a lack of
technical skills, a lack of algorithmic explainability, a lack of reliability, and the high cost of
technology. This offers a parallel, on a broader scale than that of the CAP , to the tension
between the promise of transparency and perceived opacity; however, the discussion focuses
on farmers’ adoption of digital technologies, rather than their acceptance of mandatory
administrative monitoring. A study on the factors influencing the adoption of digital
agriculture [109] indicates that concerns regarding data governance often take a back seat
to practical considerations, such as profitability. This suggests a form of conditional trust, a
point relevant to interpreting the reuse of data within the IACS (Integrated Administration
and Control System), a subject discussed in Section 4.3.
These additional sources, drawn from related fields (public policy evaluation, the
psychology of motivation, and trust in digital technologies), provide conceptual parallels for
the tensions identified within the CAP corpus. These suggest that such tensions might reflect
broader issues concerning governance, motivation, and research methodology, although
their transferability to the governance of the CAP has not been tested.
This analysis has several limitations. First, the search was restricted to a single database
and a narrow search string; no additional searches were conducted, nor was the citation
history of the works tracked. It is possible that studies using different terminology, indexed
in other sources, or belonging to the “grey literature” were overlooked; furthermore, since
the identified materials consist primarily of articles from English-language journals, the find-
ings may disproportionately reflect the perspectives of countries and research communities
that publish in these outlets. Second, the analysis is narrative in nature and does not involve
a formal quality assessment; the included studies range from formal models, technical
evaluations, and surveys to qualitative research and policy analyses, which do not provide
equivalent types of evidence. Selection, classification, and coding were performed by a sin-
gle author without independent verification, and the additional literature in this section was
chosen by the authors outside the search protocol. Nine records that had initially been set
aside for thematic overlap were reassessed and included; their abstracts are consistent with
the evidence discussed in Sections 3 and 4, although they were not examined in more depth
than the other studies. Third, most of the evidence relates to programming periods prior
to 2023, and few studies measure farmers’ perceptions of control or their actual behavior;
consequently, the conclusions regarding the 2023–2027 CAP are largely provisional.
6. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
This literature review explores the intersection between the governance architecture of
the Common Agricultural Policy for the 2023–2027 period and farmer behavior, seeking to
address three research questions. Regarding the first question, concerning the evolution of
the governance and control architecture the literature indicates that the transition toward
a performance-based model represents a significant institutional shift in the relationship
between the European Commission and the Member States. The stated benefits of this
transition depend on a systemic coherence that the current architecture does not yet fully
ensure, as evidenced by the heterogeneity of outcomes across different Member States. There
is little evidence to suggest that this shift alters how farmers perceive control, given that
they remain subject to conditionality and administrative checks. As for the second question,
concerning farmers’ perceptions of audit and control mechanisms, studies highlight the
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 26 of 31
presence of administrative costs, technical uncertainty, and uneven effectiveness; a situation
that has persisted across several programming periods. Nevertheless, farmers’ direct
assessments of these mechanisms have rarely been measured. Regarding the third question,
concerning the link between trust in institutions and behavioral response, the studies
analyzed associate perceived trust and legitimacy with how farmers react to policy design;
however, none of these studies have tested the role of trust as a mediating variable. The risk
that oversight perceived as unfair might undermine intrinsic motivation is supported by
evidence from other contexts, though its applicability to the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) remains to be demonstrated.
The primary contribution of this synthesis lies in bringing together two lines of research
that have largely developed in parallel: an institutional approach, focused on governance
architecture and audit mechanisms, and a behavioral approach, centered on farmers’ per-
ceptions, trust, and decision-making. A comparative analysis of these two perspectives
indicates that the effectiveness of the CAP cannot be evaluated solely through indicators of
procedural compliance or formal performance targets; it also requires an understanding of
how these instruments are perceived by those to whom they are directed. Furthermore, the
synthesis highlights the limitations of the currently available evidence: much of it pertains
to programming periods prior to 2023, relies on self-reported attitudes and intentions, and
combines methodologies that do not yield equivalent types of evidence.
These limitations open the way for several future research directions. First, there is a
need for longitudinal, farm-level research that correlates governance and audit indicators,
such as error rates, the frequency of inspections, and the type of verification mechanism,
with direct measures of behavior regarding the adoption of sustainable practices, rather
than relying solely on stated attitudes or intentions. A panel-based approach, tracking the
same farms over several years within the current programming cycle, would counterbalance
the prevalence of cross-sectional studies, capture the temporal dynamics of attitudes, and
allow for testing the hypothesis of the “crowding out” of intrinsic motivation within the
context of CAP governance, by comparing adoption trajectories across farms subject to
control regimes of varying intensity.
Second, Central and Eastern European member states warrant greater attention. Only
about one in eight studies included in the analysis focuses on these countries (specifically Ro-
mania, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, and Poland), even though they present unique
challenges, such as collective land use and post-socialist institutional legacies. Comparing
these member states with the founding member states could clarify whether differences in
administrative capacity and institutional history influence the relationship between control
mechanisms and farmers’ behavioral responses. Such comparisons should account for the
variations that exist within both groups of member states.
Third, the intersection between digitalization and trust in institutions requires dedi-
cated research. As remote sensing and the Integrated Administration and Control System
(IACS) become central elements of oversight within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),
there is a need for studies that correlate the technical accuracy of monitoring tools with
farmers’ perceptions of fairness and transparency. Furthermore, it is important to deter-
mine what forms of discretion, explanation, or opportunity for appeal farmers value as
the system shifts from inspector-led checks to algorithm-based verification. Such research
should distinguish between mandatory administrative monitoring and technologies that
farmers adopt voluntarily.
Although the evidence analyzed here concerns the European Union, the conclusions
have implications that extend beyond this region. Globally, many agricultural policies
are moving toward payments conditional on measured outcomes and digital compliance
monitoring; moreover, the distinction between state-level governance and how oversight
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Agriculture 2026, 16, 2493 27 of 31
is experienced at the farm level is likely to be relevant wherever such mechanisms are
introduced. For the sustainability of agriculture on a global scale, a key implication is that
the effectiveness of outcome-based, digitally monitored policies cannot be assessed solely
through administrative indicators; it also requires an analysis of how farmers perceive
these policies and how they respond to them. Given that the Common Agricultural Policy
represents one of the most extensive and well-institutionalized agricultural support systems,
its experience can offer valuable insights for other regions. However, it remains to be
demonstrated to what extent the lessons learned can be transferred to contexts characterized
by different agricultural structures, distinct administrative capacities, and varying levels of
trust in institutions.
Supplementary Materials: The following supporting information can be downloaded at https:
//www.mdpi.com/article/10.3390/agriculture16222493/s1: Table S1: Records excluded at screening
and full-text assessment (n = 18 of 99).; Table S2: Characteristics of the 81 included studies.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, G.I., I.P ., M.-C.F. and A.U.; methodology, I.P ., N.Ș. and
A.U.; software, I.P . and M.-C.F.; validation, G.I., L.Ș., I.P ., M.-C.F., N.Ș. and A.U.; formal analysis, L.Ș.,
I.P ., N.Ș. and A.U.; investigation, G.I., I.P . and A.U.; resources, L.Ș., N.Ș. and A.U.; data curation, G.I.,
I.P ., and A.U.; writing—original draft preparation, G.I., L.Ș., I.P ., M.-C.F., N.Ș. and A.U.; writing—
review and editing, G.I., L.Ș. and A.U.; visualization, G.I., L.Ș., I.P ., M.-C.F., N.Ș. and A.U.; supervision,
G.I., L.Ș. and I.P .; project administration, G.I., L.Ș., I.P . and A.U.; funding acquisition, L.Ș., I.P . and
A.U. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: The data supporting this analysis are presented in Supplementary
Tables S1 and S2: Table S1 lists the excluded records with the reasons for exclusion, and Table S2
presents the study-level evidence for the included studies, together with the contextual sources.
Acknowledgments: The authors declare that no artificial intelligence tools were used in the prepara-
tion of this manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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